

### ABSTRACT

Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) systems are vulnerable to text-to-speech (TTS), and voice conversion (VC) attacks.

Voice anti-spoofing is developed to improve the reliability of speaker verification systems against such spoofing attacks.

The fast development of speech synthesis are posing increasingly more threat.

### Main issue of voice anti-spoofing systems: Generalization to **unseen synthetic attacks**

### **Proposed solution:**

- One-Class Learning

### **Results**:

- EER 2.19%, outperforming all single systems

### Keywords:

Voice Anti-spoofing, One-Class Learning, Generalization Ability, Feature Learning, Speaker Verification, Voice Biometrics

### BACKGROUND

#### Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) Verify the identity of a speaker

- 1			
Зоі	na	fide	speech

Automatic	
Speaker	
/erification	


Decision ccept or Reject

### Logical Access (LA) Spoofing Attacks

Text-to-speech (TTS)


- Convert written text into audio with speech synthesis Voice Conversion (VC)
- Convert speech from source to a target speaker

Voice Anti-spoofing / Spoofing Countermeasure (CM) Detect spoofing attacks



# **One-Class Learning Towards Synthetic Voice Spoofing Detection**

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### RESULTS

#### Dataset: **ASVspoof 2019 LA**

	Bona fide	Spoofed	
	# utterance	# utterance	attacks
Training	2,580	22,800	A01 - A06
Development	2,548	22,296	A01 - A06
Evaluation	7,355	63,882	A07 - A19


We evaluate the performance with equal error rate (EER) and minimum tandem detection cost function (t-DCF).

#### **Comparing with binary classification loss functions**:

Loss	Dev Set		Eval Set	
	EER (%)	min t-DCF	EER (%)	min t-DCF
Softmax	0.35	0.010	4.69	0.125
M-Softmax	0.43	0.013	3.26	0.082
C-Softmax	0.20	0.006	2.19	0.059

Our proposed OC-Softmax achieves the best results.

#### Feature embedding visualization:



The bona fide speech has the same distribution in both sets, while the spoofing attacks show different distributions. The figure verifies our problem formulation and shows the effectiveness of our proposed OC-Softmax.

#### Comparing with other existing single systems:

EER (%)	min t-DCF
9.57	0.237
8.09	0.212
7.66	0.179
6.38	0.142
6.28	-
5.32	0.151
4.53	0.103
4.44	0.115
4.07	0.102
3.50	0.090
3.49	0.092
2.19	0.059
	9.57 $8.09$ $7.66$ $6.38$ $6.28$ $5.32$ $4.53$ $4.44$ $4.07$ $3.50$ $3.49$

### CONCLUSIONS

- non-target

### REFERENCES

2009, pp. 188–197.

### **CITATION**

You Zhang, Fei Jiang, and Zhiyao Duan, "One-class Learning Towards Synthetic Voice Spoofing Detection", IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 28, pp. 937-941, 2021.

### **FOLLOW-UP WORKS**

You Zhang, Ge Zhu, Fei Jiang, Zhiyao Duan, "An Empirical Study on Channel Effects for Synthetic Voice Spoofing Countermeasure Systems", in *Proc. Interspeech*, 2021, pp. 4309-4313.

Xinhui Chen, You Zhang, Ge Zhu, Zhiyao Duan, "UR Channel-Robust Synthetic Speech Detection System for ASVspoof 2021", in Proc. ASVspoof 2021 Workshop, 2021, pp. 75-82.





One-class learning aims to **compact** the target class representation in the embedding space, set a **tight** classification boundary around it and push away

One-class learning could **improve** the **generalization** ability of anti-spoofing system against unknown spoofing attacks.

The proposed system trained with **OC-Softmax** outperforms all existing single systems.







[1] Shehroz S. Khan and Michael G. Madden, "A survey of recent trends in one class classification," in *Proc. Irish* Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science,

[2] Feng Wang, Jian Cheng, Weiyang Liu, Haijun Liu, "Additive margin softmax for face verification," IEEE Signal *Processing Letters*, vol. 25, no. 7, pp. 926–930, Jul. 2018.

